Impunity, wild rumors, and poor preparation: a UAF commander explained the reasons for accidental losses in combat

Impunity, wild rumors, and poor preparation: a UAF commander explained the reasons for accidental losses in combat

The situation with AWOL is now such that people may simply not reach their unit directly. One of the factors has been impunity.

We continue to analyze the reasons for AWOL (Absent Without Leave), which is gaining more momentum and threatens the ability to conduct warfare. This time, a platoon commander, who also experienced cases of AWOL in his unit, shared his thoughts on the reasons and solutions to the problem. The interlocutor of the journalists of the publication Texty.org.ua wished to remain anonymous.

"Went AWOL before a combat mission"

— What is causing the sharp increase in AWOL recently?

— One of the factors, in my opinion, is impunity. Someone went AWOL, and not only are they not held accountable, there’s not even any investigation. And they just sit quietly at home.

Another factor is the unawareness of mobilized individuals regarding what’s happening in the army. There seems to be a widespread failure in communication.

In 2022, there were significantly fewer cases of AWOL because there were more motivated soldiers at that time. But then the number of mobilized individuals increased due to the surge in conscription, and people began to feel assured that going AWOL had no consequences. By 2024, cases of AWOL started to grow like a snowball.

The AWOL situation is now such that people may simply not reach their unit directly. For example, soldiers are sent to a brigade. They’ve already completed training, and they’re put on a train to go to the unit and be assigned. And at this point in the journey, some people might simply disappear, in other words, go AWOL.

— Can you please describe the profile of those from your unit who went AWOL?

— There is no single profile. If generalizing, these are people who had no experience in combat and overall had no concept of war. They just want to sit it out. Upon getting into the army due to mobilization and conscription, they’ve decided to sit it out there, too.

Initially, they are sent to the second line, where it’s relatively quiet, the risks are not that high, and they have time to adapt. But eventually, these people receive combat assignments and decide to go home.

— They went AWOL right from the unit?

— I observed how certain soldiers were on leave at the time of receiving an order. They conversed with guys who were already at the positions, who shared their experiences. Whether they embellished them or not, I don’t know. But those soldiers returning by car from leave also went home.

However, about half of them later returned. They gathered their courage, called, and asked if they could return. The commander agreed, said he would accept them. So, they continued to fulfill combat assignments. There was another category of deserters who went AWOL after their first combat mission. They returned from the mission and said they had enough, they were going home. Overall, about 35 percent of my platoon went AWOL.

— What were the losses in your unit at the time when soldiers began to flee AWOL?

— At that time, there were a few wounded, and of course, concussions. However, when the soldiers went AWOL after completing a combat assignment, there hadn’t been any losses yet. Those who were returning from leave — at that moment there were seven concussions and one or two wounded. The injuries were unpleasant, with shattered bones, but none were life-threatening.

But from what I heard, soldiers on leave were told a story that a tank was almost shooting directly at our trenches, and only rifles were against it. Let me put it as diplomatically as possible: this is a significant exaggeration.

"Psychologically and emotionally people are not ready"

— But then it turns out that the information on which the soldiers based their decision to go AWOL or not, they received not from some TikTok or propaganda sources, but from internal communication with other soldiers. How can this be countered?

— Let’s not forget that out of three people who heard over the phone that the situation was extremely difficult, sad, and without chances, two returned to the unit within a week and a half. That means they gathered additional information after the initial conversation, found out how things really were, and ultimately decided to return.

A lot depends on a person’s ability to perceive and analyze information, and lastly, how well-prepared they are, including psychologically. From what I can see, they were not psychologically and emotionally prepared. Were they physically ready to carry out the tasks in front of them? I think they were.

— In your opinion, what should be changed in training to ensure people are truly prepared?

— The training program slightly differs from what one can currently encounter on the battlefield. We were preparing a standard infantry unit to engage in direct infantry combat. But the nature of the war now is entirely different.

Infantry combat doesn’t happen as frequently here, on some sections, it might occur once a week, whereas one needs to constantly hide from shells and fragments, and now also from FPV drones.

Recruits, for example, have no idea that trenches still need to be dug, even during shelling, especially since the shelling doesn’t have to be directed at them. The training should develop the ability to orient during an attack, to take a maximally safe position. Some skills should be brought to an automatic level. Especially everything related to first aid.

But this does not remove the issue of proper information dissemination.

— Indeed. But perhaps the root cause might be some issues within the army itself, and their coverage is rather a consequence…

— That’s also a possibility. But we should not forget how this negative content is being generated. Who is mostly returning home from the active army now? Of course, it’s the wounded. Each wounded person carries their individual traumatic story of how they got injured, which they can share with those currently in the rear.

Conversely, soldiers who continue fighting and are not wounded mostly can’t come home to share their experience. And it’s really important to convey a diverse array of information, as experiences differ. Some, for example, fought in the battles for Bakhmut, and others were in lesser intense areas. Their experiences and testimonies will vary.

"A lot of negative information"

— Isn’t the problem that some trust has been lost within the army itself, that even when told that perhaps it isn’t all that bad, they won’t believe it?

— I think this problem truly exists. But again, it’s a question of what’s happening within the information space. There’s a lot of negative information about not caring for the people. But we do have commanders who have proven themselves highly positively, and they should be talked about.

For instance, some units, like the Third Assault Brigade, do this. Volunteers still come to them willingly. As for others not running media campaigns, they tend to be perceived under one template, likely thought to be poorly run.

Although, of course, if we’re talking about the lowest tactical level, much still depends on the command approach. When a battalion commander neglects his direct duties, people don’t want to join such a unit.

However, when a commander changes and is seen somewhere on the positions, recognized by face, it’s already an important trust factor since the person is not hiding somewhere in a basement but involved in the process.

Plus, if a commander cares about financial aspects, pays soldiers, grants leave when possible—in other words, meets them halfway—the attitude of the soldiers will also be different. And people even strive to transfer to such units. Although transferring is somewhat difficult now.

Author: Andriy Hubytskyi